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1 Introduction 
In European policy narratives, transit spaces have never been more significant than 
during the first half of 2015. Currently, we are witnessing a media frenzy and government 
hand-wringing about the Mediterranean, about how people lose their lives in the process 
of transiting and about how many people push their way into Europe seeking sanctuary. 
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This is not a new phenomenon, but it has become a quantitatively significant 
phenomenon in part because of the political situation in the Middle East. Yet the 
narrative about international migration treats the transit space as largely unimportant so 
long as these spaces are not part of the European territory (Schapendonk, 2009, 2012). 
The application of transit space as policy tool is a fair-weather phenomenon creating 
illegal migrants. By contrast, the second half of 2015 it became clear that much of the 
movement was for the purpose of finding protection. Some of Europe accepts refugees. 
But, what happens when this crisis ends? Or what happens when European borders are 
closed again, as is happening in most current developments, because people and services 
cannot cope? Does transit space regain significance as a policy tool? What is transit 
space? How can it be understood and what does it do? 
When it comes to international migration, the standard approach amongst many 
policy makers is still only to problematise the beginning of the journey and its assumed 
end. The idea that migration can be explained by a typology of push and pull factors, with 
people moving away from troubled spaces marked by strife and/or poverty towards 
spaces of affluence that draw people in, remains highly attractive (Faist, 2012). Such 
formulation of the ‘problem’ has resulted in the idea of ‘mixed flows’ that congregate in 
transit spaces (Mountz and Kempin, 2014). As a result, policy focuses on how to rid 
ourselves of the problem via return (Wolff, 2014) or resettlement, for example, to North 
America (Ambroso, 2012). From the perspective of European Governments, transit 
spaces are marginal spaces from which attempts are made to access the European Union 
in illegal fashion. Accordingly EU Governments, security experts and inter-governmental 
and non-governmental organisations try to stop such endeavours, exercising what van 
Houtum (2010) calls the ‘global apartheid of the EU’s external border regime’. In this 
conceptualisation, transit spaces have no importance in themselves – they are just the 
space that people pass through, or, better, are stopped in or turned back to, constituting 
part of the Global South rather than the Global North. 
The academic literature is more nuanced than the media and policy narratives. Here, 
we find the transit space and its use by the global policy community critically appraised 
from a historical perspective, from a perspective of geographic and ethnographic 
considerations and their political ramifications (Collyer et al., 2012). We also find 
problematisations that are spatially oriented more clearly and focus on the symbiotic 
relationship between enforcement of border control on the one hand and illicit economic 
activity of a growing industry to facilitate migration on the other, as well as on the effects 
this has on southern European countries which encounter illegal migrants1 first [Mountz 
and Kempin, (2014), p.85]. This literature is important. First, it sets out what is deeply 
problematic about ‘transit migration’ as a seemingly homogenous concept that hides the 
very diverse people, motivations for migration, and the heterogeneous ways people find 
their way towards the edges of those affluent spaces they want to access (Collyer and  
de Haas, 2012). Second, it reveals itself as somewhat Eurocentric, as it formulates the 
problem from a European perspective and does not take into account that someone in, for 
example, Morocco or Turkey may have actually aimed to be in that country rather than 
aiming to move on to European territory (Collyer et al., 2012). Third, it explores ‘transit’ 
as such – not actually a new concept, but new to the generation of experts of the new 
migration of the past 20 years (Bredeloup, 2012) – and how transit spaces affect a 
migrants’ ability to claim access, protection, status and a voice. Tazzioli explains that 
“the migration regime brings to the fore an issue concerning the spatial ontology of 
governmentality” [Tazzioli, (2015), p.5 (italics in the original)]. Tazzioli goes on to point 
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out that this new migration field “is formed by a heterogeneous production of spaces and 
works through the articulation of different spatial regimes” [Tazzioli, (2015), p.5]. 
What characterises this new migration of the late 20th century? Calling international 
migration during this period ‘new’ is justified by most literature in changes such as the 
collapse of the USSR, new wars and broader changes to the global order propelled by 
globalisation (here mainly but not exclusively understood in its economic incarnation), 
and the EU’s increased relations with its neighbours (Koser and Lutz, 1999; Düvell, 
2005; Betts and Milner, 2006). The drivers for European bureaucrats problematising this 
‘new’ migration negatively, rather than positively as an opportunity for enrichment 
(through ideas, etc.), have been rising narratives of fear about the disruption of cultural 
and social homogeneity. These narratives have come to be embodied in arguments over 
loss of control over mobility and the resultant exploitation of European systems of 
freedom and protection (most often expressed through fear of welfare abuse). So the 
space in these narratives is invested with negative potential bringing about threats to 
Europe’s security. 
Discursively, an awareness of transit space has involved diversification of 
classifications and conceptual innovation. For example, ideas have been introduced of 
‘secondary onward movement’ which leads to ‘mixed flows’ accumulating in ‘transit 
countries’. These depictions enable the logic of ‘illegal migration’ by establishing a 
seemingly homogenous grouping around unidentified commonalities involving illegality, 
high risk, lack of control and an assumption that everybody who is on the move from 
‘elsewhere’ is bound for Europe (Collyer et al., 2012). As Jones (2009) observes, this 
discourse of boundary drawing and maintaining requires a lot of technocratic effort to 
sustain the perception that we, as Europeans, are threatened.2 
What seems interesting to me is the argument made in the literature that technological 
advancement both facilitates and brings new possibilities for inhibiting movement. As 
elaborated in the following sections, I am not so much interested here in how this changes 
old and new routes of mobility [as explored, for example, by Carling (2007), Collyer 
(2010) and de Haas (2006, 2008)], but in how the dynamic of facilitating and inhibiting 
mobility by different actors creates in these transit spaces new social spaces of both 
violence and solidarity. With this emerges an embryonic politics of a ‘world apart’, rather 
than a ‘world without’ as imagined by European policy makers and constructors of this 
space. I draw on earlier work, in which I have shown how European policy-making 
narratives have first constructed our contemporary meaning of the ‘transit country’ and, 
in doing so, made the ‘illegal migrant’ intelligible and actionable in the first place 
(Oelgemöller, 2010),3 and go beyond it here to thinking about what constitutes space in 
the context of transit. 
I argue that transit spaces are important to think about in their own right. There is 
significant research that shows not only that there is quite a lot going on in the transit 
space, but also, more significantly, that transit space is imbued with questions of 
authority and contest, and is productive of a particular kind of the social. Transit space is 
not an unimportant ‘space without’; it is here conceptualised as ‘space apart’ – not a 
country with a clearly defined perimeter, but unbound space diffusely and flexibly 
opening out. In this sense transit space is productive of abandonment and abjection, as 
much of the academic literature very importantly shows; but I want to focus on the 
following-on transit space, at least speculatively, as constituting the possibility of 
autonomous spaces of ephemeral political action outside the straightjacket of imposed 
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governance driven by policies of the European Union and, more generally, countries of 
the Global North. I thus draw on Lefebvre and Arendt to help me understand transit space 
conceptually as creative space in which what is legitimate is shifting and marked by 
different kinds of violence where people actively engage. In order to do so, I first review 
briefly the dominant imaginings of transit space as starting ‘without’, but essentially 
diffuse and impenetrable. I then ask what space is by invoking different authorities, not as 
an exercise in political thought but in order to discuss the relationship between space and 
ephemeral acts of autonomy, which leads into a review of how activities otherwise 
understood as abject and/or illicit bring about such ephemeral spaces of equality and 
freedom. 
2 Diffuse and impenetrable spaces ‘without’ – European imaginings 
The space considered here is the space constructed in the context of international 
migration of the late 20th century, which is a rather recent phenomenon, at least in terms 
of its ‘expert’ attention. I use ‘expert’ with reference to migration management ‘experts’, 
which include international organisations, such as the IOM, European bureaucrats and 
security technicians (Bigo, 2014). These spatial knowledge practices are not exclusively 
relevant to the European Union and its geopolitical relationships, though the transit space 
is most certainly an idea that began with the doctrine formation of European home affairs 
and police/border control officers in the 1980s (Oelgemöller, 2011). Here, I focus on the 
Maghreb for illustrative purposes, but strongly suggest that some of the empirical 
realities articulated here apply equally to spaces found in such locations as Australia, 
North America and their neighbourhoods. 
2.1 One-sided boundary drawing 
One question to be addressed is how it is possible that policy-making and some academic 
analysis are driven by an underlying assumption of ‘space without’. Lefebvre (1991) 
suggests that historically there were two approaches to the analysis and understanding of 
space. First, there was the theoretical space, demarcated by cartographers. He writes 
“mathematicians appropriated space … an ‘indefinity’ … At once highly general and 
highly specialized, the language of mathematics set out to discriminate between and 
classify all these innumerable spaces as precisely as possible” [Lefebvre, (1991), p.2]. 
This is the space artificially drawn, ignoring the perceived and thus ignoring the common 
sense of living in space. 
Second, there was the lived space, which is made accessible through imagination. 
Lefebvre labels this ‘mental space’, “which is apparently, but only apparently,  
extra-ideological” [Lefebvre, (1991), p.6] and criticises that this is a construction which, 
although lacking logical linkage, is separated from social practice and, therefore, remains 
a space created entirely as space of knowledge construction, devoid of substantive 
character and disintegrated. Constructing space like this is “a trend subordinated to a 
centre or to a centralized power and advanced by a knowledge which works as power’s 
proxy” [Lefebvre, (1991), p.9]. In order for such theoretical space to ‘work’, abstraction 
and imagination are needed, in addition to the effort of thinking of space as something 
both vast and concrete. It is for this reason that I briefly illustrate Europe’s imaginings of 
transit space below. 
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Visual communication is discursively important. Many of the pictures we encounter 
in the press, even before the beginning of 2015, are of two kinds and may help us 
understand European imaginings. We see European uniformed men and military 
equipment (naval ships), in encounters with people of non-European origin. The 
European men handle women and children, imagined largely as victims, who are in 
subdued poses and needing to be physically supported and regulated. They are victims 
because they are weak and uprooted. This, seemingly, has nothing to do with ideology, 
but is a mere enactment of Lefebvre’s space, made concrete by those victims appearing 
uninvited and problematic on ‘our’ doorstep. More often, we see young black men who 
attempt the illegal journey. They are, quite literally, a huddled mass in the images we see, 
confronted by European officials in uniform, who loom authoritatively. Here, too, we see 
a very concrete expression of Lefebvre’s imagined mental space. The assumption in 
much of the imagery and its accompanying narrative is that these young black men are 
reckless towards themselves, to the families they have left behind, and towards the 
community of Europeans who are at risk of illegitimate exploitation. They travel in 
unseaworthy vessels, do not play by the rules of legitimate access and willingly endanger 
themselves and others. At the same time, there is an impression of vastness, of indefinite 
space, as they, the reckless men and the women and children, come from some unknown, 
unspecified place in great numbers. We see images not so much of individuals, but of 
cramped and crowded boats with lots of undefined, coloured bodies. A space is created 
that might then be used to induce fear – of overcrowding, of unknown people of unknown 
origin from unknown places. 
Interestingly, those approaching the victims and young men are alien-looking people 
in uniforms that increasingly resemble the protective clothing of a pest controller. The 
choice of clothing plays a part in subtly communicating the myriad of fears to be felt 
from influences coming from ‘without’. The uniform, in general, communicates 
important messages that feed into this imaginary. Objects such as clothing communicate 
meaning; they take particular subject positions and act as important tools to the European 
imaginings. The white ‘pest suits’ worn by border controllers at the edges of the 
European Union suggest cleanliness, emphasising the possibility of disease among those 
pressing to enter Europe. They make visible the difference between civilised Europeans 
and those victims and criminals. They communicate to the European citizen that possible 
threats are controlled. They also erase the individual identity of border controllers. They 
create easily differentiated groups, emphasising the boundaries in the encounter between 
the victims/criminals and the world of stability and health. Combining pest suits with 
military equipment emphasises the assumed threat emanating from these people; a mental 
space is constructed, demarcated by a space of quarantine and a space of safety for 
Europeans, which seems to need protection. The white suit makes visible the boundary at 
which transit space starts. 
Such navel-gazing by the Global North is not only traceable in imagery; it is 
introduced by international organisations with a mandate for protection as well. Düvell 
(2012, p.417) thus shows how “a UN publication identifies transit migration with ‘flows 
of irregular and illegal migrants from the Third World and from East European countries’ 
UN/ECE (1993: 7) and stresses that transit migrants reach their destination ‘by means 
that are partially, if not fully, illegal’”. This is constructed as a form of territorial 
invasion, which has been much discussed in the literature on migration and security 
(Weiner, 1992; Walters, 2004; Bigo, 2014; Huysmans, 2006; Squire, 2010; Doty, 2011; 
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Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). Prosperous countries that exert their entitlement to 
authority freely (Lefebvre’s centralised power), such as those of the Global North, thus 
set up the cause, justification and solution to this seemingly obvious problem of 
international migration, basing them on assumptions of rightful superiority. This 
perspective is spatial, insofar as the assumed destination is a defined place. Because of 
geographic proximity, the destination place needs protection by law and by military and 
public health measures, whilst anything that came before is not imagined in any 
particularity, being ‘space without’. 
2.2 Space without 
Reading European policy documents highlights further how transit space is imagined as 
‘space without’ – beyond the one-sided boundary demarcating the ‘beginning’ of the 
Global North with all its connotations of health, security and stability. Standards for 
enforcement action (including capacity-building measures funded through development 
funds) are set in such a way that the beginning (or end, depending on perspective) is 
clear, but the space acted upon is left diffuse, with the onus on the generalised ‘partner’. 
Thus, the joint communication on implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy 
2013 begins by stating “in the Southern Neighbourhood, the overall political situation [is] 
often hampered partner countries’ readiness to implement the agreed reform agenda” 
[EC, (2014), p.4]. The operative phrasing here is ‘partner countries’ readiness to 
implement’ reform, which reads, as elaborated in the example below, very much like a 
blueprint of neoliberal measures without apology, but with European values added to the 
mix. This is not surprising, given that neither Europe nor its southern Mediterranean 
‘partners’ can easily withdraw from wider global dynamics. What is troubling is the use 
of language of incentivised policy and funding, indicating that these relationships are 
asymmetrical rather than egalitarian, and the imposition of values that Europe itself does 
not live up to, such as the avoidance of discrimination, protection of those in need and the 
extension of human rights (be they civic-political or socio-economic). Here the picture of 
space-making becomes a bit more complicated. Demarcation is imagined here, but it is 
one-sided; there is concrete space bounded on one side by the dividing line between the 
Southern ‘partner’ and the well-functioning European Union, but, importantly, there is 
diffuse and impenetrable (indefinite) space from the point where ‘readiness of the partner 
to implement’ is required. 
To illustrate this point, the European Neighbourhood Policy document under the 
heading ‘Migration and Mobility’, states that “Important achievements were recorded in 
the Southern Neighbourhood. A Mobility Partnership between the EU and Morocco was 
signed in June4, the first with a southern ENP partner, and one with Tunisia was signed 
on 3 March 2014” [EC, (2014), p.11]. The plans for action, which complement the 
European Union’s wider strategic policy, then set out targets to be achieved by these 
partners, focusing mainly on democratisation, trade and reform for good governance. In 
addition, they set out issue-related expectations, such as in the area of managing 
migration in these countries to “achieve better organisation of legal migration, to 
maximise the positive effects of migration on development, to effectively fight irregular 
migration and human trafficking, to cooperate in readmission and better border control, to 
promote international protection and enforcement of asylum and to promote respect for 
migrants’ rights, including Moroccans and others who find themselves in Morocco”  
[EC, (2013), p.22].5 The fact that such a general list of expectations is so open for 
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interpretation emphasises the problematic dynamic between imaginings of the definitive 
territorialised nation-state, the specialised expectations, and the undefined and general 
prescriptions. The documents leave no room for what Lefebvre identifies as social 
practice that does not conform to what the understandings of European experts and neatly 
sidestep the myriad problems arising out of notions of sovereignty. They outline 
expectations, formulated in the operational plans as directed towards particular countries; 
yet the guiding policy imagines ‘southern partners’ as a rather open and diffuse space 
with the implication that this space can be extended. It is a creation of space without. 
This is amplified in a June 2015 press statement of the EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini: “EU has never taken the issue 
of migration as seriously as we are doing now”. The statement goes on to announce the 
EU’s latest naval operation, EUNAVFOR Med: “With this operation, we are targeting the 
business model of those who benefit from the misery of migrants. But it’s only a part of a 
broader strategy including the cooperation with our partners in Africa” (Mogherini, 
2015). The statement seems to assume a structured and organised migration business with 
malevolent intent. Dubious as this assumption is (as Carling, 2007, for example, 
suggests), the first step to be taken, according to Mogherini, is surveillance and 
assessment of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the area. Thus policy making 
seems to rest entirely on assumptions rather than on evidence, and on interpretation of a 
particular kind of movement situation, without acknowledging that this interpretation is 
informed by what Lefebvre calls ‘ideology’. There is no space allowed here for questions 
concerning the destructive role of European policy-making in bringing about the 
businesses that facilitate international movement. Further, the above suggests that there is 
an imagined boundary at the border to the Southern Mediterranean, after which the 
imaginary of diffuse ‘space without’ begins. 
It is important to understand that such imaginings are not part of a move to  
re-territorialise (which would involve the construction of a bounded, institutionalised 
place); rather, space is both left undefined and acted on. The ‘space without’, neither 
imagined as bordered place nor as cultural space, begins with the European external 
border and expands outwards. Once again, there are images to illustrate this point. In the 
popular press, images of trucks full of young men in the Sahara make this notion of 
diffuse space tangible; national boundaries are not at stake here. Yet, it is not only 
diffuseness that drives the EU’s imaginaries. Another category of image – the portrayal 
of impenetrability – extends the spectrum of influences on European imaginings of transit 
space as ‘space without’. We see images of narrow-laned medinas in which possibly 
illicit transactions are planned, in which illegal migrants can hide and disappear 
temporarily, and in which the rule of law is replaced by barter over services and prices, 
including in the trade in human beings. We also see pictures of people living rough in the 
mountainous areas of Morocco, dark, with high trees – distinctly untransparent and 
difficult terrain for surveillance purposes. 
These imaginings, or representations, then enable the European Union to propose 
single-minded policies, such as the destruction of boats used by smugglers, and disables 
empathy with illegal migrants or any possibility of thinking about them as subjects and 
agents. As indicated above, the logic of transit space as ‘space without’ is generalisable, 
as Australia shows in its dealings with Indonesia (see also Missbach and Philips in this 
issue). Lefebvre describes this as alien space, which is abstract space that is quasi-
geometric, yet without a clear idea of its contours and ordered only by abstract notions 
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(such as the vastness, the darkness, the impenetrable narrowness of the transit space set 
against the concreteness of well-governed space, quarantined space and values to be 
implemented). Such imaginings disable our ability to think about the space, in which a 
dynamic variety of relationships are taking place. In the following, I turn to questions of 
how such imaginings constitute claims to authority over knowledge and an ephemeral 
politics and sociality. 
3 Space and ephemeral acts of autonomy – creative space 
Lefebvre’s critique of conceptions of space, which I have made use of above, is 
important. The two modes of analysis on which the European Union and its migration 
experts seem to base the construction of their imaginings of space fall short of what 
Lefebvre wants to grasp as the ‘contradictory space’ that opens up the possibility for 
creativity. “Social space embodies distinct and distinctive ‘traits’ which attach to the 
‘pure’ mental form of space… Their analysis tells us what it is that confers a concrete 
(practical) existence upon space instead of leaving it confined within (mental) 
abstraction” [Lefebvre, (1991), p.292]. He explains: 
The thought of technocrats oscillates between the representation of an empty 
space, quasi geometric, occupied only by concepts, by logics and strategies at 
the highest rational level - the representation of a space finally filled, occupied 
by the results of these logics and strategies. They do not perceive that in the 
first place all space is produced, and consequently that this product does not 
come from conceptual thought that is not immediately a productive force. 
[Lefebvre, (1956), p.36] 
Here, I do not read ‘productive force’ in the strictly Marxist sense of the relations people 
need to enter into in order to survive, as this implies a much more regulated and directed 
activity, but rather as a space of interaction in which publicity, solidarity and violence are 
made. Space in this understanding is a constellation in which appearance is realised, in 
the sense of Arendt’s ‘worldliness’. It is a constellation insofar as people come together 
in public space, meeting and acting based on what Arendt (1998) terms ‘inter-esse’. For 
Arendt, what is relevant is not inter homines esse (being among men), as this is not 
understood as political, but inter-esse homines (being with others), which is political –  
a space of appearance [Arendt, (1998), p.50] in which worldliness unfolds. 
Arendt envisages political space and time where, as soon as it appears, 
‘someone’ opens up, introduces himself, shares of himself; this is the space and 
time of Öffentlichkeit, publicity and opening … of the unthought, the forgotten, 
the repressed, …; the space and time of the public’s Becoming, of “publicity” 
where the unspeakable and the invisible seem straightaway signifiable. 
(Kristeva, 2006) 
It is space in which what is legitimate, and what is not, is shifting, debated and contested 
(Arendt, 1964a). Worldliness is contestation of repressive power and rejection of 
coercive authority [Springer, 2011; Jun, (2010), p.51]. Contestation is judgement of, for 
example, the authority of bureaucracy, which is problematic precisely because it is so 
abstract, as shown above. It is anonymous and acts on space (-making), without respect 
for nuance or Lefebvre’s ‘traits’ of the concrete. Springer, drawing on Arendt, explains 
that 
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Public space is understood as the battlefield on which the conflicting interests 
of the rich and poor are set, as well as the object of contestation. Within this 
realm, violence is acknowledged as both an outcome of attempts to impose an 
‘ordered’ view of public space originating ‘from above’, and often as an act of 
resistance ‘from below’ by those seeking radical democratic spaces of 
‘unscripted’ interaction. [Springer, (2011), p.526] 
My claim here is that transit space is such a contested public space. It is a physical space 
that is needed to enable people to come together, and it is a space that is capable of 
different kinds of violence, but ultimately it enables world through inter-esse, in the sense 
of inter-esse homines. Such a constellation, this worldliness, needs to be understood as 
conflicted insofar as both authority and autonomy need to be interrogated as elements 
constructing the transit space, or, in Lefebvre’s words, as constructing ‘contradictory 
space’. In order to unpack this thought, I turn briefly to a discussion of authority, which is 
followed by more detailed consideration of the problem of autonomy. 
Authority is not neutral and, as such, my use of the word begs the question of what is 
‘good’ authority and what is ‘bad’ authority. This question is relevant, as authority can 
either enable or inhibit autonomy. Furthermore, those coming together in the transit space 
cannot easily be differentiated between as those holding and acting on authority or those 
holding and acting on autonomy. There is a need for evaluative clarification. Jun (2010) 
points out that, if coercive authority is ‘bad’, what the coercion consists of needs to be 
identified. He explains that coercive does not just mean “the de facto capacity to exercise 
power over others, but also the de jure license or warrant to exercise power over others” 
[Jun, (2010), p.52]. In the scenarios of the transit space, I have already analysed 
European imaginings and the resultant enforcement of policy as ‘abstracted space’ in 
which the European Union and its migration experts impose their standards and thus their 
authority via a mix of ‘incentives’ and conditionality, despite the rhetoric of 
‘partnership’. The hegemonic logic and the relatively powerful geopolitical positioning of 
countries of the Global North enable their assertion of authority over the ‘partners’ and 
thus the conditions in which the presumed illegal migrants act. This is done rather 
indirectly, as, in Jun’s words, relationships of opaque authority are established, which “is 
arbitrary, [and] in turn implies that people have no reason to recognise its power over 
them” [Jun, (2010), p.52]. On the one hand, the logic of illegality is normalised; on the 
other hand, the logic of designating Southern neighbours as safe (for migrants), but still 
in need of greater effort to democratise and implement the rule of law, seems to be agreed 
upon. Given that both these logics are almost universally accepted, EU policy making 
vis-à-vis its North African neighbours is part of normal foreign policy relations and is not 
considered, at least not publicly, problematic. At the same time, the ways in which this is 
enacted and practised is made opaque by the use of words such as co-operation (for 
example, in combined policing efforts) and capacity-building (for example, by providing 
technical assistance). 
European dictate is bureaucratic violence; it is distant and anonymous, which, in 
Hannah Arendt’s view, makes it so much worse because it removes the potential for 
answerablity (Arendt, 1964b). An example might illuminate this point: The border fence 
around Melilla on the continent of Africa bracketing bits of left-over colonial territory 
still held by Spain is an advanced security solution, and is considered a humane construct 
as it did not have razor wires when it was installed. The fence abutting Moroccan 
territory is bent outwards and has a movable section on top to trap anyone who makes it 
up that far. Between the fences there is metal mesh which tenses on contact, trapping 
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anyone who jumps or falls onto it. Then there is a small fence and another tall inner 
fence. The ‘humane’ construct also boasts movement detectors, cameras and the capacity 
to spray peppered water in case of a bigger assault. Although it may not lacerate a person, 
as razor fences do, it is still capable of killing. It is funded by the Spanish Government 
and the European Union [Andersson, (2014), pp.89–130]. This is bureaucratic violence, 
ordered and constructed at arms length, controlled by anonymous functionaries behind 
screens. Europeans do not need to get into personal contact; there is no inter-esse in 
either sense of the word. There is little room for worldliness; it is unlikely there will be 
any witnesses to create publicity, no one to look into the eyes of the ‘humanely’ deterred 
and to hear their contestation. Overall, though, this is domination both in its aggressive 
form and in its assumed entitlement to speak and make decisions for others – it is opaque. 
It denies people the capacity for inter-esse, for becoming public, for introducing and 
sharing one’s full complexity as a person, and for dissenting. Jun draws on Goldman 
(1998) to explain that opaque authority violates the self-respect and autonomy of not only 
the migrant who happens to have arrived in this particular space, but also all others who 
inhabit this space and are with those myriad others. 
Another form of coercive authority is enacted more directly, though no less 
arbitrarily, by state institutions that are pressed to implement agreed reforms. This is not 
to say that the violence enacted here is less relevant; it is to say that such violence is of a 
different order, being physical and direct. For example, in raiding a camp where people 
live rough, the police enjoy almost total impunity in their dispersal and arrest practices. 
Guards in places of detention have almost total impunity when they take payments to turn 
a blind eye when someone wants to make a break. Missbach and Sinanu (2012) illustrate 
this vividly, drawing on fieldwork in Indonesia. The direct contact changes the dynamic; 
it is physically more violent than a border fence, but this violence is not opaque. In a 
situation of direct contact, there might be the possibility, however faint, for sharing 
oneself in a way that is difficult to be ignored. There is the possibility of judgement, of 
fleeting moments of autonomy against coercive authority. 
In another example, there is the coercive authority of those who are not in a formal 
(governmental) position, who offer knowledge and services to facilitate onward journeys. 
These facilitators hold authority by offering a transaction. This activity is criminalised as 
smuggling (with an assumption of criminality directed at the migrant who buys the 
services) or trafficking (with an assumption of deception of the unassuming person who 
is moved across borders). Either way, arguably there is the potential for coercion and 
violence in such transactions and services. While these practices are not new, they have 
become more pronounced and more dangerous because of the Global North’s policy and 
practice of transit space. Jun categorises this kind of coercive authority as de jure licence. 
Yet, it is also this category that makes the notion of contradictory space most tangible; 
wherever people are forced to be immobile, there will be activities to break their 
immobility, in this context by enacting an illicit economy around the attempt to move 
across borders, where coercive formal authorities deem such crossing illegitimate. 
In the case of transit space, then, the seemingly clear-cut dynamics of powerful actor 
versus victim are suspended. Acts of autonomy here need to be understood at the same 
time more radically and more humbly; they are ephemeral acts made possible in public 
concert with risks of violence attached as well as having generative potential. They take 
place in relation to a violent order imposed by the European Union alongside competing 
orders generated domestically and in relation to regional dynamics of the South and 
globalisation more generally. Autonomy and worldliness in the transit space are 
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ephemeral acts in the dynamic between the imposition of abstracted space and unscripted 
worldliness. Relationships are temporal, movable and breakable. 
I am not using autonomy here in the sense of its use by the ‘autonomy of migration’ 
school of thought (Rodríguez, 1996; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2003; Mezzadra, 2004; 
Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Nyers, 2011; Khosravi, 2010; De Genova, 2010). The 
‘autonomy of migration’ literature draws on Marxist traditions. It focuses on political 
agency and migrants’ capacity to subvert and therefore transform their context, drawing 
on experience and action in order to challenge sovereign power and citizenship, 
understood in the narrow sense of the territorial nation-state (McNevin, 2013). This 
intellectual engagement with international migration, and in particular with illegal 
migration, is, in part, a reaction to much of the literature of international relations, which 
is focused on control producing the securitised subject and its abjection and often draws 
on Giorgio Agamben as inspiration for analysis (Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2005; Hyndman and 
Mountz, 2008; Andrijasevic, 2010; Rygiel, 2011). Mobility in the ‘autonomy of 
migration’ school of thought is conceptualised as preceding control. Acts of resistance 
are accorded such powerful momentum that “the state cannot respond by expanding its 
inclusion practices; instead a fundamental transformation of the state’s own structure is 
initiated” [De Genova and Peutz, (2010), p.14]. Most welcome as that would be, the 
linear, often individualised, logic of this conceptualisation belies practices concerning 
transit space which seem to point in a rather different direction, in which space is more 
and less regulated and in which clear assignations of directed, rational subjectivity might 
be romantic.6 
Subjectivity can be read as a distinctly spatial construct. It is seen as a structural gap 
within the order of language than becomes contingently occupied by the acting individual 
(Howarth, 2013). In other words, the subject is the place, co-constitutive of spatial 
relations and subjectification, with which individuals come to identify and are identified, 
but it remains contradictory, in a similar way to the context of space discussed above. 
The political act is a coming into this place by way of problematising the assigned role 
(Rancière, 2004) as, for example, being illegal and hunted, and becoming public (Arendt, 
1998) and worldly, rather than either submitting to it or overthrowing it as an act of 
rationality and self-control. This is the making visible of the structural gap, the moment 
when the political order is shown to be less than coherent and the agreed order is shown 
to be as contradictory as the subjects are. Such moments of rupture can lead to demands 
to be counted and to be representative of an alternative universal (Newman, 2007). Here, 
I am thinking of those migrants who stage themselves with posters inscribed with slogans 
such as ‘we are humans’, ‘we have dignity’, ‘we won’t go back’, as seen in the media. 
Yet, these are not acts that necessarily transform authority’s structures, as De Genova 
suggests. They are ephemeral acts of contestation and creativity. They are ephemeral acts 
of worldliness made possible by the particular, contradictory, space that transit is. 
4 Social embryos of political existence? 
The universal emerges in a contingent way. It can emerge by staging visibility in the 
transit space, such as through the posters demanding to ‘open the way’. However, this 
can only be a momentary, fleeting moment in which the world of abstract space and the 
world of autonomous acts become visible to each other, as the longer staging of such 
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visibility would lead to authority’s violence – the staging of European order. In this case, 
worldliness would be undermined and coercion would reign uncontested. Equally, the 
deliberate turning away – that is, refusing to submit to such order – can lead to ephemeral 
moments of an autonomous act, as authority collapses without its recognition and 
scripted submission and response. Coercion relies on agreement in an asymmetrical 
relationship: if the illegal person ‘talks back’ as an equal, when, for example, facing the 
police in a raid, there will be a moment of surprise, maybe hesitation – a recognition 
takes place. Transit space is, then, space in which there are moments of “absence of 
coercive authority and absence of concentrated power exercised ‘from the top down’” 
[Jun, (2010), p.54]. This does not mean that coercive authority is removed. Yet, these 
moments enable a beginning, a momentary glimpse of an embryonic social. Or, put 
differently, they allow glimpses of a struggle for equality, defined here by drawing on 
Proudhon “as an ideal state of affairs that is both desirable and realisable” [Jun, (2010), 
p.54]. This state of affairs implies ‘freedom to be’, the ability to speak and act for oneself, 
as witnessed by and in community with others, in all the variety of ways that people 
establish worldliness. Thus, it is a collective process of making social space in which the 
subject comes to be and act, and, in turn, produces space. This constellation needs the 
physical space for people to come together, collaborate and appear as legitimate 
claimants (Springer, 2011). Such recognition might lead to a different outcome than 
violence of arrest, physical violence and deportation back into the Saharan desert 
(Collyer, 2010), although it might just as likely lead to no more than a moment’s 
hesitation. In both the visible and the withdrawal, there is a claim to a particular 
universality, which is constructed around the idea of equality of legitimately inhabiting 
space in both senses of inter-esse (being among and with others) as horizon. For this kind 
of autonomy to make sense, collectivity is needed, and this collectivity is realised in 
space. Autonomy in this sense is the capacity to come out and be worldly in the social 
space; thus, transit space becomes creative space that can bring about political existence. 
There is no doubt about the abjection that is part of the reality of transit space: when 
migrants crossing the desert are robbed by gangs and left naked and without food; when 
they are dumped by Moroccan authorities at the Algerian border, beaten and humiliated 
after raids; when they are deceived by both legitimate actors (for example, Spanish 
authorities) and illegitimate (from the point of view of European order) actors with 
promises to take them to the European mainland only to find themselves deported or 
stationary and relieved of their meagre funds; when people have slowly grown into their 
subjectivity of the hunted illegal, which has grave impact on mental health, by walking in 
certain ways, being constantly alert and observing their environment (Andersson, 2014; 
Johnson, 2014). This kind of abjection is created in the undefined space that constitutes 
transit, as shown in the examples above, and not in relation to a specific place or to a 
specific person. It is devoid of any relation of answerability. It is the abstract and 
intangible that creates abjection. Yet, this is only part of the story. 
The other part is duly ignored by those imagining abstract space, whenever possible. 
It is the story of migrants mirroring governance structures, building communities by 
electing their own ‘governments’, establishing mid-way houses and ghettos, supporting 
each other with information, working with police and border guards, finding creative 
ways to circumvent the ‘humane’ security solutions put up by the EU. It is the story of a 
politics of ephemeral acts and moments in which the dominant order is either challenged 
or ignored and sidelined. These short-term communities are not altruistic. ‘Pushers’ or 
‘facilitators’ in Niger (Lucht, 2013) or Mauritania (Andersson, 2014) are, more often than 
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not, people who are themselves on the journey, have been unsuccessful, learned, lost 
money and are now regaining funds to move again from those currently on the move. 
Ghettos are run by people who might have been in one place longer than others and 
collect a fee that admits and protects. After a while, they are off and someone else takes 
over (Johnson, 2013). Johnson (2014, pp.151ff) calls these ‘communities of mobility’, 
since, even if people find themselves temporarily immobile, the idea of movement is 
always present for most of them (Andersson, 2014). Importantly, the persistent presence 
of movement does not inevitably mean these people strive to head towards Europe. Yet, 
if they do, the communities show solidarity in organising attacks on the fences together, 
in organising who goes begging or selling goods, and thus have an eye on their group’s 
protection. There is no claim for fundamental structural change, but there is a ‘space 
apart’ – one of political existence. 
Thus, this scenario begs the question of which order is actually illicit? Governments 
of EU member states and the European Union itself offer incentives to African 
Governments and police forces to enact their border paranoia, such as security gadgets, 
study visits and work visas, financial support for civil society and international  
non-governmental organisations, in a cynical parody of working towards human rights 
and protection (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen, 2013; Andersson, 2014) in an effort to 
hunt the elusive black, young man who looks like a candidate for illegal migration on the 
basis of supposed intentionality (Andersson, 2014). These governments invest in myths 
and fantasies of (in)security by pouring money into the defence industry to supply 
products for ‘humane’ security solutions that cost millions of euros of taxpayers’ money. 
Civil society organisations happily accept European funding to spread the word about the 
dangers of the journey (Andersson, 2014). Is this not also illicit and deeply violent? Or is 
this acceptable because our governments are democratically elected and our civilised 
world accepts that the monopoly of violence rests in the hands of the sovereignty we 
trust? 
5 Conclusions 
At the start of this article I made the statement that the idea of transit is a fair-weather 
policy instrument. By that I mean that transit space is relevant in situations when the 
geographic neighbourhood, as demarcated by the big geopolitical boundaries between the 
Global North and the Global South, is not challenged by immediate war and conflict such 
that the Global North is induced to pay attention. As the current situation in Europe, with 
the many thousands of refugees from Syria and elsewhere, shows, if there is geopolitical 
conflict of such severity that people just move, there is at least a core of European 
countries that act on the values they proclaim and offer protection, irrespective of the 
perceived strain such action brings. Other European countries seem unwilling to set their 
navel-gazing attitude aside. Sooner or later, governments will draw back from their 
narrative of mixed flows and return to using the transit space, as evidenced by EU 
negotiations with Turkey over Syrian refugees. It is for this reason that I think it is 
important to clarify what transit space is and to recognise it not only as a space of 
abjection, but also as a space in which ephemeral acts of worldliness are possible, 
however violent they may be. In this conceptualisation, transit space is interesting for its 
capacity to constitute the social embryos of political existence. 
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The constellation we are looking at is contradictory space, being both: 
1 abstract space (Lefebvre): it is controlled by an order-imposing authority which 
seeks to suffocate its openness and in which abjection and death are outcomes; and 
2 creative space (Arendt/Springer), in which people have inter-esse, which produces 
ephemeral moments in which no-one is entitled and able to impose authority. It is 
agonistically inclusive but can turn violent. 
Space in this reading is marked by ephemeral relationships: fleeting, dissolving, 
temporally intangible. It can be both violent and social, in a kind of solidarity. The 
communities that make and are made by such a space are transgressive and ephemeral in 
character; they are communities that act with, within and on spaces that are not 
exclusively pre-designed by sovereign-coercive power but interact with it. What is 
important here is to understand that EU policies are simultaneously the condition of 
possibility for the particular kind of illegality of the transit space (abjection) and the 
condition of possibility for ephemeral space (solidarity/creativity). It is a space that is 
marked by autonomy – the freedom of speaking for oneself, reinventing oneself and 
presenting oneself to others to form world – however precarious this is in terms of the 
becoming and dissolving of social power. 
There is no expectation on anyone’s part in these spaces to establish hegemony and to 
sacrifice freedom for a higher force (for example, the state). These collectives are not and 
cannot be sufficiently institutionalised to subordinate, as they are a communities of 
people who simply want to move. They form a community of practice that is constituted 
inter-relationally, marked by continuous reconfiguration, breakdown without crisis, 
openness to changed relations and new people, and occasional engagement in political 
negotiations, violent and otherwise. Transit space is contradictory space; what makes it 
political is the appearance of interaction of logics with practices of both violence and 
solidarity in which the domination of one order is undermined without establishing 
another order. Definitions of what is licit and what is illicit are suspended, or at least 
thrown open to question. This makes transit space important. Scepticism is in order 
before judging transit space exclusively as abject, criminal and threatening, as such 
judgment sits firmly in the authoritarian imaginings that drive destructive and uninformed 
European policy. 
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Notes 
1 I consciously use the term ‘illegal migrant’ to indicate that this category is a legal construct 
imposed by governments making law and acting on it, rather than any of the more benign 
terms to designate those mobile people crossing or attempting to cross borders in what is often 
defined as an illicit act. 
2 My use of ‘we’ in conjunction with ‘European’ is justified by a poststructuralist approach, in 
which my own positionality is that of a privileged European passport holder as well as 
participant in expert discourses on international migration. As such, my focus is on Europe 
and European discourse as an amalgam emerging out of interactions between EU institutional 
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practices and EU country narratives, making meaning that is then projected both as universal, 
but contested, and directed towards the European neighbourhood. 
3 In this 2010 article, I have critically reviewed scholarly arguments and policy instruments to 
show the discursive construction of the transit country and its effects; here, I draw on this 
article to take the opportunity to think more concretely about the kind of space that is created. 
4 One of the major agreements in this policy related to the return of any migrant reaching 
European territory through Morocco, irrespective of nationality. 
5 Author’s translation from the French original. 
6 See Mezzadra (2004) for a more subtle discussion of subjectivity. 
